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How OFACScreen matches names

If you are buying a screening tool you are buying its matching. Everything else is plumbing around it. This page describes what OFACScreen actually does when you type a name, including the parts that do not flatter us, because a vendor who will not name their method is asking you to take the most important part of the product on faith.

Everything here is testable in the free search, which costs nothing and needs no signup. If a claim on this page is wrong, the search box will show you.

The short version

  • Every name, yours and every one on the lists, is romanized to plain ASCII letters and digits and lowercased. That normalized form is what gets compared.
  • Comparison is trigram similarity: both strings are cut into overlapping three-character runs and scored on how many runs they share.
  • Aliases are searched alongside primary names. An entry that matches only through an alias is scored on its best-scoring alias, and the result tells you which alias caught it.
  • An exact match on the normalized name or on any alias scores 100%. A query whose words all appear in a candidate's words scores at least 85%.
  • Wallet addresses, ID numbers, email addresses, websites and phone numbers are not names, so they are not fuzzy matched. A query shaped like one is also compared exactly against the identifiers the lists publish, and a hit scores 100%. A website or email address that only shares a listed domain, and a phone number that differs only by its country code, score 90%.
  • The default cut-off is 0.3. Batch runs and daily monitoring use 0.4. The dashboard search and batch upload let you pick a tighter or looser one, and the REST API takes a threshold between 0.0 and 1.0 on each request.
  • There is no phonetic pass. No Soundex, no Metaphone, no NYSIIS.

Step one: Both sides are romanized

Sanctions lists are published in a mixture of scripts. The EU Financial Sanctions File carries entries whose primary name is written in Cyrillic, Arabic, Hangul or Chinese characters, and the UN, Canadian and Swiss lists carry non-Latin spellings as aliases alongside their Latin ones. A screening tool that simply dropped the characters it could not read would reduce an Arabic query to whitespace and report the target clear, which is the worst answer a sanctions tool can give.

So every name is romanized before it is compared, on both sides. Punctuation is removed, diacritics are stripped, everything is lowercased, and runs of whitespace are collapsed. "PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovich" and "Владимир Путин" end up in the same alphabet, which is the only way a comparison between them can mean anything.

What romanization does not do is reproduce the exact spelling a given list chose. Transliteration schemes disagree with each other, and the trigram scoring downstream is what absorbs the residual difference. Here is how the scripts actually behave, which is worth knowing before you rely on any of them:

  • Cyrillic and Greek. These romanize close to the spellings the lists use. Type "Владимир Путин" and you get the same answer as "Vladimir Putin".
  • German umlauts. An ä, ö or ü is read two ways: as its plain vowel and as the vowel followed by e, which is how German writes it without the letter. So "Müller" matches a list's "MUELLER" and "MULLER" at 100%, and "Mueller" matches a listed "Müller". Two spellings that both lack the umlaut are not treated as the same name: "Mueller" against "MULLER" is still scored on its trigrams, because on the lists an ae, oe or ue is more often something else, as in "Michael", "PAEK" or "Nikolaevich".
  • Hangul. Handled specially, see below.
  • Kana. Hiragana and katakana are romanized in Hepburn. "シノダ ケンイチ" becomes "shinoda kenichi" and matches the SDN entry spelled that way. One caveat worth knowing: a run of kana becomes a single word, so a name written as one unbroken run scores lower than the same name written with a space or a separator between its parts.
  • Arabic. Arabic script does not write short vowels, so romanizing it produces a consonant skeleton: "أيمن الظواهري" becomes "ymn ldhwhry". Both sides go through the same transformation, so this matches the Arabic-script names and aliases the lists publish, which the EU, UN, Canadian and Swiss lists carry in quantity. What it does not do is bridge to a Latin-only entry: a consonant skeleton scores very poorly against a fully vowelled Latin transliteration. In practice an Arabic-script query surfaces the right entry through the Arabic alias the list carries, and the entry is then displayed under its Latin name.
  • Han characters. Romanized as Chinese. See the gap section below, because this one has a sharp edge.

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Korean gets two readings, deliberately

Korean is the one script where a generic romanizer produces a dangerous answer, so it is worth explaining why we treat it differently.

Revised Romanization is the modern South Korean standard, and it is what an off-the-shelf library produces. It is not what the sanctions lists use. OFAC, the UN, the EU and the UK all write "KIM Jong Un", "RI Pyong Chol", "PAK Tong Sok". Revised Romanization writes those same three names "Gim Jeong Eun", "Ri Byeong Cheol" and "Bak Dong Seok". None of those spellings appears on any list we carry. A Hangul query romanized the modern way scores about 0.24 against the list spelling, which is below every threshold this product offers: a DPRK name would come back Clear.

So Hangul is romanized twice. The first reading follows the convention the lists themselves use, and that is the one used for ranking. The second is Revised Romanization, kept as an additional probe rather than discarded, because the lists are not consistent with themselves either: across the corpus the Korea programs carry names spelled both "Kim" and "Gim", both "Jong" and "Jeong", both "Pak" and "Bak". The minority spellings are real designated people.

You can check this in the free search. Type 김정은 and the top result is the OFAC SDN entry "KIM, Jong Un" at 100%.

Step two: Trigram similarity

Once both names are in the same alphabet, they are compared by trigram similarity. A trigram is a run of three consecutive characters. "putin" contains the trigrams that overlap across it, and similarity is the proportion of trigrams the two strings share. It is a character-level measure, which is exactly right for the failure mode sanctions screening actually has: transliteration drift and spelling variation, where the letters are mostly the same and mostly in the same order.

Aliases are searched too

Sanctions lists carry alternate spellings, birth names, transliteration variants and business names as aliases, and a great many real matches arrive through them rather than through the primary name. An entry surfaces if either its primary name or any of its aliases clears the cut-off.

An entry appears once, no matter how many of its names matched. It is scored on whichever of its names scored best, the primary name or an alias, so an entry that matched only through aliases is scored on its best-scoring alias. When an alias did better than the primary name, the result shows you which alias caught it, so you can see why the entry is in front of you.

The exact-match boost

Trigram similarity alone under-scores some obviously correct answers, so two adjustments sit on top of the raw score:

  • If your normalized query is identical to the entry's normalized name or to any of its normalized aliases, the score is 100%. For a name with an umlaut, either spelling counts. For Korean, either reading counts, so a Hangul query that matches a list's minority spelling is reported as the confirmed match it is rather than hidden behind a medium-confidence one.
  • If every word of your query appears among the candidate's words, leaving out single letters and legal forms such as LLC or Ltd, the score is at least 85%. This is what puts "Vladimir Putin" at the top when the list spells the entry "PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovich".

Apart from the identifier matches below, nothing else moves a score. There is no hand-curated list of famous names, no boosting by list, and no re-ranking by anything other than the score you are shown.

Wallet addresses, ID numbers and contact details are matched exactly

The lists publish more than names. OFAC designates digital currency addresses, many entries carry a cédula, a passport or a tax number, and OFAC and the UK list record email addresses, websites and phone numbers for many of the parties on them. Trigram similarity against names can never find one of those, so a pasted listed address or ID number would come back clear. They are matched separately, and exactly, because an identifier either is on the list or is not.

  • Wallet addresses. A query of 25 to 128 letters and digits, with no spaces, is compared against every address the lists publish as a digital currency address. Case is ignored.
  • ID numbers. A query of at most 25 characters, made of letters and digits, optionally split by spaces, dots or dashes, and containing at least four digits, is compared against the listed ID numbers. Spaces, dots, dashes and case are ignored on both sides, so 79.123.456, 79 123 456 and 79123456 are the same search. A leading "IMO" is ignored, so a vessel's IMO number matches with or without it.
  • Email addresses. A query shaped like an email address is compared against the listed email addresses. Case and surrounding spaces are ignored, and nothing else is.
  • Websites. A web address or a bare domain, such as rosneft.ru, is compared against the listed websites by host: the https://, a leading www., the port and the path are ignored. A listed website on the same host scores 100%.
  • Domain matches score 90%. A website query also finds the listed email addresses at its host, and an email query the listed websites and other addresses at its domain. A subdomain counts as its domain (shop.example.com finds example.com), never the other way round. These say "domain match" after the listed value. Free mail providers and social platforms, such as Gmail, Yahoo, Mail.ru, Yandex, QQ, Facebook and Telegram, never give a domain match, since anyone can have an address there: only the exact address, or the exact page, matches.
  • Phone numbers. A query of 9 to 15 digits, with an optional + and any spaces, dashes, dots or brackets, is compared on its digits alone, so +7 (495) 123-45-67 and 74951234567 are the same search. The same number with the country code on one side only scores 90% and says "matched without the country code". At least nine digits must agree, so a local number without its area code is not matched.
  • Only the ID types where one number names one party. Colombian cédula and NIT, Mexican RFC and CURP, passport, national ID, tax ID, and IMO or vessel registration numbers, under each list's own spelling of those labels. Registration and licence numbers are left out on purpose: they are short, reused across registries, and an exact hit on one says little.
  • Exact means exact. Part of a number does not match, and neither does a number one digit off. A hit scores 100%, or 90% for the domain and country code matches above, and the result says "Matched on:" followed by the type and the value as the list prints it.

The name search runs as usual alongside this. An identifier hit is listed first, and the same entry is not repeated as a name match.

Thresholds: The real numbers

The score you see is the score used. Results are shown to you sorted by it, with a match level attached: high at 80% and above, medium from 50%, low below that.

  • 0.3 is the default cut-off, used by the free search on /screen/, by the dashboard search, and by the MCP tool. It is deliberately loose. A screening tool that quietly hides weak matches is making your review decision for you, and the whole point of the score column is that you make it.
  • 0.4 is used by batch CSV runs and by daily monitoring, both of which then treat 0.5 and above as a match worth flagging. These are unattended processes producing a queue for a human, so they run slightly tighter than an interactive search.
  • Broad, Standard or Strict, which are 0.3, 0.4 and 0.8, can be picked on the dashboard search and on a batch upload. Each form starts at its own default above, and the audit trail records the one used. Whatever you pick, 0.5 and above is still flagged as a match, so Strict hides matches between 0.5 and 0.8.
  • Any value from 0.0 to 1.0 can be set per request on the REST API with the threshold parameter.

A search needs at least two characters, and returns at most 500 matches. There is no industry-standard threshold number, and any vendor quoting one is guessing. Whatever cut-off you settle on, write down what it was and why, because an examiner will ask how sensitive your search was.

What we do not do

  • We do not run a phonetic pass. No Soundex, no Metaphone, no NYSIIS, no double metaphone. Phonetic algorithms catch sound-alike names that share few letters, and they cost you a large volume of false positives on short names. We use character-level similarity plus romanization instead. That is a trade-off: if your risk profile is dominated by sound-alike English names, weigh it.
  • Korean written in hanja is a known gap. Han characters are romanized as Chinese, because that is right the overwhelming majority of the time. It is wrong for Korean names written in Chinese characters: 金正恩 romanizes as "jin zheng en", not "kim jong un", and does not match the SDN entry. If you hold Korean names in hanja, convert them to Hangul or to the Latin spelling before screening.
  • We do not trace wallets on-chain. A wallet address is flagged only when a list publishes that exact address. Exposure through other wallets that transacted with it is invisible to us, and an address-level blockchain analytics tool is the right instrument for that.
  • We do not match on date of birth or nationality. Those fields are shown on a match, from the source list, so you can rule a hit in or out. They are not part of the search itself. ID numbers are searched only when the query is one, as described above. A name search never uses them.
  • A score is not an identification. On a name, a 100% score means the strings are identical after romanization, and nothing more. Two different people share a name every day. Compare the date of birth, the locations and the ID numbers on the match before you act on it. See How to Handle an OFAC Match.

Test it yourself

None of this requires our word for it, an account, or a card. Open the free search and try:

  • 김정은, Hangul, against a list that spells it "KIM, Jong Un".
  • Владимир Путин, Cyrillic, against Latin-script entries spread across several lists.
  • シノダ ケンイチ, katakana, against "SHINODA, Kenichi".
  • Ayman al-Zawahiri and then Ayman Zawahiri, to see hyphenation and a dropped particle handled.
  • 金正恩, hanja, to see the gap described above with your own eyes.

If you want the result of one of those searches as a document, the sample report shows what that looks like, and any search can be turned into one for $9.99 without an account.

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